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Abstract
Many popular social programs have limited coverage among households at
the very bottom of the income and wealth distribution. If a program reaches
the poor, but neglects the destitute, the (pre-program) income distribution of
participants and non-participants will cross. We are interested in the statis-
tical methods that can be used to test for this particular pattern of program
participation. Our numerical simulations suggest that recently developed tests
for distribution crossing are powerful even when the two distributions under
study are fairly similar and they can be usefully combined with more stan-
dard quantile tests to characterize program participation among the very poor.
We apply this approach to data on household expenditures and membership
of micro-credit groups in India and ﬁnd that participation among the poorest
households in the study area was lower than that of slightly richer households.
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during the period of data collection, to Charlie Brown, Julie Cullen, Esther Duﬂo, Roger Gordon,
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‡Delhi School of Economics, rohini@econdse.org1 Introduction
All public programs face the challenge of reaching intended beneﬁciaries. Documented
deﬁciencies in many older social transfer mechanisms have led to the emergence of
innovative methods of reducing poverty. Microﬁnance schemes have become especially
popular and are at the centre of redistributive policies in many countries.
These programs have undoubtedly improved the lives of millions of poor households.
The Grameen Bank of Bangladesh reports loans to over 7 million poor borrowers in
2007 and many similar microcredit institutions exist all over the world. Yet, there are
reasons to suspect that these and other government initiatives to alleviate poverty
do not adequately serve the really destitute. Extreme poverty is often accompanied
by levels of education, nutrition and information that are not conducive to program
participation. Social ostracism may also make it hard for some of these households
to be involved in group activities and their limited contact with bureaucrats may
exclude them from state subsidies.
There is some evidence to suggest the empirical validity of some of these mechanisms.
Morduch (1998) ﬁnds that although microﬁnance institutions in Bangladesh stipulate
that only households below a given asset threshold are eligible for receiving loans,
these eligibility rules are often violated. In a diﬀerent context, Paxson and Schady
(2002) estimate beneﬁts from social funds in Peru and ﬁnd that the poorest 7% of
households are less likely to beneﬁt than those that are moderately poor.
The purpose of this paper is to explore statistical methods that are appropriate to
test hypotheses about the relative exclusion of households in the bottom tail of an
income or asset distribution. If a program is well-designed to cater to the poor but
not to the destitute, the population distributions of participants would cross that
of non-participants from below. Standard tests of ﬁrst order stochastic dominance
would not be applicable in such cases, and, depending on the position of the crossing,
some higher-order dominance relations may also not hold.
2We perform numerical simulations with alternative pairs of distributions and we ﬁnd
that nonparametric tests that explicitly test for distribution crossing are powerful,
even when the two distributions under consideration are fairly similar. We show how
these might be usefully combined with standard sign tests for income quantiles to
characterize the population that is best served by a particular program.
Speciﬁcally, we use the method outlined in Chen et al. (2002) to test the null hy-
pothesis of equal distributions against the alternative of a single crossing, with the
distribution of participants crossing that of non-participants from below. This ap-
proach also provides us with an estimate of the crossing point. We use sign tests to
test hypotheses about diﬀerences in the quantiles of the two distributions to the left
of this estimated crossing point. Typically, the further an income quantile is from
the crossing point, the greater the distance between the two distributions and the
more powerful a quantile test is likely to be. The estimate of the crossing point is
therefore useful in choosing an appropriate quantile at which the two distributions
can be compared.
In Section 3 we present power comparisons for examples drawn from families of uni-
form and two-parameter exponential distributions. We ﬁnd the test for distribution
crossing to be extremely powerful even for small sample sizes and for cases in which
the chosen distributions for the two groups are very similar. Not surprisingly, the
power of the sign test increases as we test for quantiles further away from the cross-
ing point. The simulation results lead us to conclude that if there is reason to believe,
a priori, that there is a unique threshold below which program participation is diﬃ-
cult, a combination of tests for distribution crossing and quantile tests can be useful
in examining the pattern of household participation in a social program.
In Section 4, we apply these methods to test for poverty targeting in a rapidly growing
microﬁnance program in India. Our data do not include a comprehensive measure
of income, but do contain annual household expenditures under several major heads
such as food and clothing, health, education and entertainment. The data come from
3a household survey that was administered to a random sample of members of newly
formed microcredit groups ( to ensure that program beneﬁts had not aﬀected house-
hold income) and a randomly selected sample of non-members. We compare the total
household expenditure in the above categories for members and non-members. We
ﬁnd evidence that the distribution of members cross that of non-members from be-
low. Sign tests indicate a preponderance of non-members among the poorest quarter
of the population; in this range, expenditure quantiles for the member distribution
appear to be higher than those for the population as a whole.
2 Statistical Methods
We denote the population distribution of program participants by F(x) and non-
participants by G(x). In our microﬁnance application, these are the members and
non-members of women’s savings and credit groups. Sample sizes for these two
groups are n and m respectively and the two samples are denoted by X1,...,Xn
and Y1,...,Ym.
We are interested in testing a null hypothesis of equal distributions against the alter-
native that the distribution of participants cross that of non-participants from below.
The Kolmogorov Smirnov test is commonly used to test for the equality of two distri-
butions. This has two principal disadvantages in our setting: the typically low power
of this test makes it unlikely that we reject the null when the population distributions
of the two groups are fairly close. Also, as is well recognized, the rejection of the null
does not provide much information about the alternative.
We focus on methods which test the null of equal distributions against the explicit
alternative of a single crossing. Deshpande and Shanubhogue (1989), Hawkins and
Kochar (1991) and Chen et al. (2002) present alternative tests of this type. We choose
the test statistic proposed by Chen et al. (2002) over the Deshpande and Shanubhogue
4test because unlike the latter test, it requires no prior information on the position of
the crossing point and such prior knowledge is unlikely in most applications. Their
test is also shown to be more powerful than the Hawkins and Kochar test in a variety
of examples and has the additional advantage of providing an estimate of the crossing
point. Since by deﬁnition, the fractions of both groups are equal at this point, this
is an estimated upper bound on the incomes of the households that are relatively
neglected by the program. For the sake of completeness, we brieﬂy summarize their
methodology before proceeding to discuss our results.
Let Z1,...,ZN be the combined sample of X0s and Y 0s and Z(1) < Z(2) < ...,Z(N)
be the order statistics of this sample. We wish to test
H0 : F(x) = G(x)
against the alternative
HA : F(x) < G(x) when x < x
∗ and G(x) < F(x) when x > x
∗.




(G(t) − F(t)) + sup
x≤t
(F(t) − G(t)) − |F(x) − G(x)|
The value of λ(x) at any point x is simply the sum of the largest diﬀerence be-
tween the distribution of non-participants and participants for values less than x, the
largest diﬀerence between participants and nonparticipants above x, and the distance
between these functions at x. Under the null hypothesis, λ(x) is zero and under the
alternative, it is maximized at the crossing point.
The sample counterpart of λ(x) is given by
λN(x) = sup
t≤x
(Gm(t) − Fn(t)) + sup
x≤t
(Fn(t) − Gm(t)) − |Fn(x) − Gm(x)|
5where Fn(x) and Gm(x) are empirical distributuion functions corresponding to F(x)






The order statistic Z(j) is an estimate of the income level at which the distributions








for testing H0 against HA. Large values of the statistic are unlikely under the null
of equal distributions. Exact critical points for small samples are tabulated in Chen
et al. (1998). The asymptotic distribution is not standard and the authors present
asymptotic critical regions based on Monte-Carlo simulations. The relevant critical
value is presented with our simulation results below.
In the following sections we combine the above approach with sign tests for population
quantiles to the left of the estimated crossing point. Sign tests are probably the most
commonly used nonparametric procedure to test for population quantiles.1 If two
distributions cross in the manner speciﬁed under the alternative hypothesis stated
above, income quantiles for the participant distribution would be higher than those
for non-participant distribution to the left of the crossing point. Moreover, we might
expect to ﬁnd the diﬀerence between the two quantiles to be largest as we move away
from the crossing point to smaller income levels. For diﬀerent values of p, we test
the null hypothesis that the pth quantiles of both distributions are equal by using
a test statistic based on the number of participants below the p(m + n)th ordered
observation of the combined sample. We use asymptotic critical values based on the
normal distribution.
1A description of these tests can be found in most standard statistical texts. See for example,
Gibbons and Chakraborti, 1992.
63 Simulation Results
We compare the test procedures described above using simulated data from three al-
ternative pairs of distributions for participants and non-participants. In each case, we
start with a base distribution of non-participants G(x) and alternative distributions
of participants F(x), all of which cross G(x) at the median income level. We apply
the crossing point test to samples from the base distribution and each variant of the
participant distribution, and then use sign tests to test hypotheses about diﬀerences
in quantiles of the two distributions to the left of the estimated crossing point.
We consider three diﬀerent families of distributions. In the ﬁrst case, G(x) is uni-
formly distributed on (0,1) and F(x) has uniform distribution on (a,b). The point of
intersection of the two distributions is a
1+a−b. In order to ensure that the two distri-
butions cross at the median level of income, we choose our parameters a and b such
that a + b = 1. We choose alternative values of a and b and examine the power of
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Figure 1: G(x) ∼ U(0,1), F(x) ∼ U(a,b).
7next two cases are drawn from the family of two-parameter exponential distributions.
G(x) = 1 − exp[−λ2(x − θ2)], x ≥ θ2,λ2 > 0
F(x) = 1 − exp[−λ1(x − θ1)], x ≥ θ1,λ1 > 0
The two distributions cross at x∗ =
λ1θ1−λ2θ2




We ﬁrst set the scale parameter λ1 = 1 and the location parameter θ1 = 0 for the
non-participant distribution G(x), and, for the distribution F(x), we consider various
departures in location and scale parameters subject to (2). In the second case, we
set λ1 = 2 and θ1 = 0 for G(x). These two cases are shown in Figures 2 and 3
respectively. We choose parameters in Case 2 for which the two distributions are very
close. We do this in order to examine the behavior of these tests for when the null
and alternative hypotheses are very similar.
For each of the cases described above, we use equal-sized samples of 2 sizes (i) n =
m = 50 and (ii) n = m = 100 and perform 5,000 iterations. For the crossing test we
use the simulated 5% critical point of 1.529 given in Chen et al.(2002). We perform
sign tests for quantiles of order p = .1,.2,.3 and .4 and use 5% asymptotic critical
values based on the standard normal distribution. Power comparisons of these tests
based on these simulations are shown in Tables 1- 3.
The tables show that the power of all the tests increases as the sample size increases.
For all the cases we consider, the power of the distribution crossing test is uniformly
higher than that of the sign test. The sign test is powerful for quantiles of small order
but declines quite rapidly as we consider quantiles close to the crossing point ( the
median). Not surprisingly, the power of all tests increases as we move away from the
base distribution, and the diﬀerence between the null and the alternative hypotheses
becomes more marked.




















Figure 2: G(x) ∼ exp(1,0)























Figure 3: G ∼ exp(2,0)
9Table 1: Power Comparisons for Uniform Dstributions.
Value Sample size Test Power
of a per group Sign Test for pth quantile Crossing Test
p=.1 p=.2 p=.3 p=.4
.4 50 1 .989 .770 .343 1
100 1 1 .934 .405 1
.3 50 .992 .864 .425 .173 1
100 .999 .988 .698 .466 1
.2 50 .902 .494 .156 .081 .981
100 .995 .701 .280 .065 1
.1 50 .347 .141 .055 .036 .466 .
100 .575 .174 .068 .021 .836
Table 2: Power comparisons for Exponential Distributions, Case 1.
Value Sample size Test Power
of λ per group Sign Test for pth quantile Crossing Test
p=.1 p=.2 p=.3 p=.4
3 50 1 .966 .660 .247 1
100 1 .998 .864 .272 1
2.5 50 1 .914 .493 .189 1
100 1 .998 .788 .201 1
2 50 .996 .827 .350 .122 .988
100 1 .957 .593 .146 1
1.5 50 .896 .490 .149 .074 .809
100 .989 .700 .273 .057 .989
10Table 3: Power comparisons for Exponential Distributions, Case 2.
Value Sample size Test Power
of λ per group Sign Test for pth quantile Crossing Test
p=.1 p=.2 p=.3 p=.4
4 50 .994 .842 .349 .120 .995
100 1 .971 .610 .123 1
3.5 50 .972 .713 .258 .097 .964
100 1 .897 .443 .093 1
3 50 .888 .490 .162 .060 .792
100 .994 .695 .26 .055 .985
2.5 50 .537 .190 .062 .047 .394
100 .797 .284 .097 .031 .723
4 An Application to Data from an Indian Micro-
ﬁnance Program.
4.1 Data
Our data is from a microﬁnance program in the state of Jharkhand in Central India.
The growth of microﬁnance in India has been quite diﬀerent from that in most other
countries in that it has been dominated by non-government organizations, voluntary
savings groups and nationalized commercial banks rather than by specialized micro-
ﬁnance institutions (Harper, 2002). Non-government organizations organize women
into self-help groups with between 10 and 20 members. These groups initially pool
their own weekly savings and facilitate risk-sharing among their members by lending
accumulated savings to those members in need of credit. After doing this successfully
for about a year, the group opens a savings account at a nearby commercial bank
11and its members collectively borrow from the bank for both income-generating ac-
tivities and for their consumption needs. The Reserve Bank of India (India’s central
bank), has issued guidelines to nationalized commercial banks that encourage bank
linkages with these groups and the banks are oﬀered credit at subsidized rates to
further promote such lending.
The microﬁnance program we study is administered by PRADAN, a non-government
organization which has created about 2,000 groups in the state of Jharkhand since
1992. Jharkhand is among the poorest of the 27 Indian states, with over half its
population below the national poverty line. Our main objective was to examine the
extent of participation in the program by households at the very bottom of the income
distribution. Our strategy was to compare the distribution of household spending
across samples of randomly selected households who had members in newly formed
self help groups and other households in the area.
Our sampling frame consisted of households in 100 villages in which at least one new
group had been formed during the period April 1st to June 30th, 2002. A total of 149
groups had been formed in these villages during the speciﬁed period. The 100 villages
with new microcredit groups were partitioned into 4 geographical clusters and a simple
random sample of 6 villages was drawn from each cluster. A total of 24 respondents
were surveyed from each of these villages- 6 of them members of microcredit groups
in the village and the remaining 18 randomly selected non-members from the same
village. Our sample therefore consists of 576 households in 24 villages.
The survey was conducted over a period of two months starting in August 2002. Very
little lending takes place in the months immediately following group formation and
a comparison of the characteristics of households in the program with those of other
randomly chosen households in the area can therefore be used to evaluate the extent
to which the program targeted the poor.
We collected data on a large number of economic indicators such as the quantity
12and type of food consumed, annual expenditures under several major heads, the size
and condition of the household’s main dwelling, land owned and cultivated and the
possession of durable goods. We have no direct data on household incomes and in-
stead use the sum of annual expenditures for several major expenditure categories as
a proxy for income. These categories are: Clothing and footwear, schooling, health,
renovation, entertainment and other social expenditures and food and non-food ex-
penditures at the weekly village market (converted to annual ﬁgures). We also asked
respondents about their contact with the government bureaucracy and about any
beneﬁts received from government sponsored programs. Responses to these questions
allow us to examine the extent to which poor households who do not participate in
the program receive assistance from other oﬃcial poverty-alleviation programs.
If we compare households with new group members to those with no members, we
ﬁnd mean values of most variables are very similar for the two groups. The member
households own a little more land on average, but have slightly lower household
expenditures. Based on standard tests for diﬀerences in means we reject the null
hypothesis of equal means for only one of the listed variables, the number of meals
consumed in the two days prior to the survey. Of the households with members in
self-help groups 17% had fewer than three meals a day for the two days prior to the
survey, whereas this is true for 33% of the non-member households. This type of
food inadequacy is a particularly stark characteristic of extreme poverty and these
numbers suggest that the program might neglect or be ill-suited to households in the
bottom tail of the income distribution. The slightly higher mean expenditures for
non-member households and the higher fraction of households with food inadequacy
are consistent with participation rates being lower at the two extremes of the income
distribution than in the middle, i.e. with the hypothesis of the member distribution
crossing the non-member distribution from below.
The empirical distributions of annual household expenditures for the two groups are
shown in Figure 4. Based on the methods described in Section 2, we test the null hy-
pothesis that the distributions are equal against the alternative that the distribution
13of members crosses that of non-members from below. The test statistic, JN takes a
value of 2.04 and we therefore reject the null hypothesis at the 1% level. The level
of annual household expenditure at the estimated crossing point is 12,240 Indian
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Figure 4: Empirical distribution functions of annual household expenditure for mem-
bers and non-members.
We ﬁnd that 56% of each group in our sample has expenditures below this point. If
the probability of being included in the program rises with income and then falls,
the crossing point gives us an upper bound on the income levels of the households
neglected by the program, since we have equal fractions of members and non-members
below this income-level. To get a better idea of exactly who is neglected, we could
supplement this by other methods, such as kernel density estimates or proportions at
diﬀerent population quantiles below this level. Figure 5 presents kernel densities of
household expenditures for the two groups.2
The estimated densities ﬁrst intersect at annual expenditure level of 6,432 rupees.
This is about $145 or about $24 per capita given the average household size of 6. A
2We use Epanechnikov kernels and optimal bandwidths. Half bandwidths equal 2415 for non-
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Figure 5: Kernel densities of annual household expenditure for members and non-
members.
little under 23% of households are below this level of expenditure. Table 4 compares
household characteristics for the ﬁrst expenditure quartile with the rest of the sample.
The ﬁrst-quartile households consume about 40% fewer foodgrains (by weight) as the
other households, they spend about two-thirds less on clothing and footwear, they live
in smaller dwellings and eat fewer meals. The households with low participation in
the microcredit program also seem to be excluded from other public programs and the
political process more generally. Only 11% of these households had ever approached a
government oﬃcial compared to 32% of other households. Perhaps the most striking
observation is that the fraction of households receiving subsidized foodgrains from a
government anti-poverty program was no diﬀerent for these households than for the
rest. It appears that poor households with low participation rates in microﬁnance
programs also have lower access to other welfare programs.
15Table 4: Household characteristics of the ﬁrst quartile and other households.
ﬁrst expenditure Top 3 expenditure
quartile quartiles
Meals consumed during the two 5.16 5.48
days prior to the survey
Number of rooms 2.23 3.59
in dwelling
Foodgrain consumption per 2.46 4.37
day in normal times (kilograms per household)
Annual expenditure on clothing 1216 4029
and footwear (rupees)
Land owned .83 1.22
(hectares)
Fraction ever approached .11 .32
government oﬃcial
Fraction received goverment .51 .51
subsidized foodgrains
165 Conclusions
For a variety of plausible reasons, poverty alleviation programs may not reach the
poorest households in an area. We explore how statistical methods can be used to
test the hypothesis that a program neglects the bottom tail of a distribution in favor
of slightly richer households.
We ﬁnd that recently developed tests of distribution crossing are extremely powerful
in testing such a hypothesis even when diﬀerences in the distributions of the two
groups (participants and non-participants) are not large. We advocate that these
be combined with quantile tests to examine program participation among very poor
households.
We apply these methods to a microﬁnance program in India. We ﬁnd evidence that
the population distributions of program participants and non-participants cross, and
households in the bottom income quartile are less likely to be program participants
than those in the middle two quartiles. These households also appear to have limited
access to public programs which are, in principle, designed for their beneﬁt: they
are no more likely to be on oﬃcial poverty lists and government-sponsored social
programs.
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